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1 
Approaching the Unsynthesizable in International Politics. Giving Substance to 
Security Discourses through Basso Ostinato?1 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the question how spatial difference manifests itself in 
International Relations discourses in an effort to theorize difference in 
international politics. In doing so, we focus on the concept of security in particular 
and demonstrate a paradox in its conceptualization. Despite the aspiration to 
capture global diversity, contemporary security discourses largely leave out the 
moment of subjectification in knowledge construction. Rather, a form subjectivity 
construction is promoted in these discourses, which is reliant on the other. In 
contrast, this paper considers the unsynthesizable cognitive void between the self 
and the other through the work of the Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao 
and his basso ostinato concept. By drafting it as a heuristic device to avoid the 
potential of determinism for which basso ostinato was criticized, we apply it on 
the concept of comprehensive security with the intention to demonstrate that 
ostensibly same concepts can have different meanings in different times and 
spaces. In doing so, we aim to transcend the resulting misunderstandings that 
obstruct International Relations scholarship from contributing to what Amitav 
Acharya calls “Global IR”. 
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Introduction 
Security studies have progressed significantly since the early 1990s. Moving on 
from traditional conceptualizations of security as the absence of (military) threat 
and ensuring the survival of nation-states (cf. Bellamy, 1981: 102; Walt, 1991: 
212), more recent contributions have broadened our understanding of security by 
relating it to a wide array of previously disregarded referent objects (Wæver, 
1996). Amongst others, these referent objects comprise of concerns about the 
environment (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998) – most recently in relation to the 
Anthropocene (Dalby, 2014; Keohane, 2015) – as well as the protection of human 
dignity and human bodies (Chandler and Hynek, 2011). In the course of these 
debates, a provocative question has been asked by Jef Huysmans (1998). Similar to 
a recent intervention by Erik Ringmar (2016) for International Relations (IR) at 
large, Huysmans wondered what is meant when the term “security” is being used. 
So far, however, this question has been left largely unanswered, although it is not 
given that all actors in the cognitive void of intercultural contexts refer to a 
putatively same term like security in the same meaning. 
In the present paper, we do not claim to provide a satisfying answer to Huysmans’ 
question, but we intend to unravel one of its layers by investigating how difference 
is manifested in analytical concepts and how this affects our understanding of 
international politics in general and security in particular. Situating ourselves 
within recent debates on difference (cf. Neumann, 1996; Inayatullah and Blaney, 
2004; Tickner, 2011; Tickner and Blaney, 2012; Behr, 2014), we ask if difference is 
fully acknowledged in terms of ‘how meanings are made’, as Ringmar (2016: 101) 
puts it. By investigating the substance of differences, we aim to demonstrate that 
the concept of security is a process in the form of an ‘open becoming’, as Yaqing 
Qin (2016: 37) writes, due to ‘ever changing relations’ and ‘unlimited 
possibilities’, rather than a fixed entity. To be able to do so, we approach the 
unsynthesizable realm of knowledge production in international politics through 
the work of the Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao and his basso ostinato 
concept in particular.  
This concept denotes a substratum underlying human thought. Basso ostinato is in 
constant flux as it is socio-historically constructed; however, it is experienced by 
people as a relatively stable, yet intangible, intellectual framework, much in the 
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way Ty Solomon and Brent Steele draft affects as becomings by referring to Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari. However, if affect is a ‘less than conscious, embodied’ 
(Solomon and Steele, 2016: 10) aspect which is always in flux, how can we be 
conscious of the difference between self and other in the first place? If Solomon 
and Steele are correct, a cognitive void must exist in which the self and the other 
co-exist without being conscious of this void. This is what we call the 
unsynthesizable.  
In order to get a more nuanced picture of basso ostinato and the unsynthesizable, 
we start with Maruyama’s borrowing of this concept from musicology. As a musical 
term, it connotes ‘a recurrent pattern of bass notes’ which is ‘an underlying motif 
that is independent from the treble part and, if the main theme appears in the 
treble part, it is bound to undergo some modifications’ (Maruyama, 1988b: 27). For 
Maruyama, this was visualized in ideologies that have influenced Japan throughout 
history but have evolved abroad, for instance Confucianism, Buddhism, Liberalism, 
and Marxism. Inspired by Karl Mannheim’s thought-style, he argued that if they are 
carefully analyzed, the underlying motif can be identified, as it is never fully 
integrated into the general melody. It is a specific ‘pattern of thinking’ that subtly 
changes the main theme. Consequently, these ideologies were gradually and 
almost unconsciously Japanized because they converted into slightly different 
ideas, bringing the melody and the underlying pattern into synchronicity without 
absorbing the former into the latter. Moreover, these two parts have to be 
perceived as continuously evolving (Maruyama, 1976; 1988b; 1992). This 
“unconscious consciousness”, is tacitly shared in a largely geographically defined 
community. Therefore, imported political ideas retain an imperceptible otherness, 
as heterogeneous ideas evolve alongside each other and cannot be fully integrated 
(Maruyama, 1961: 71).    
In employing basso ostinato, it is our aspiration to discuss one way by which 
humans can arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the unsynthesizable by 
accepting the ‘parallel processing’ (Maruyama, 1996b: 188) between the self and 
the other. Following Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2001: 34), we want to tell 
‘different stories about IR’ in ‘parallel’ and not ‘in opposition to each other’, in 
order ‘to develop concepts … from non-Western contexts on their own terms and 
to apply them … to other contexts’ (Acharya, 2014: 650). To do so, we follow 
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Huysmans’ (2002: 52) advice and draft basso ostinato as a heuristic device by 
proceeding in a historical mode as outlined by Richard Devetak (2014). As basso 
ostinato is a concept that Maruyama developed throughout the Showa-Period 
(1926-1989), the specific temporal and spatial context has to be traced in order to 
gain a more profound understanding of this concept. This includes engaging with 
the languages that played a role in formulating basso ostinato, as languages 
constitute an a priori for imaging, formulating, and constructing life-worlds 
(Koselleck, 2002: 24-26). This also means that this paper carefully calibrates the 
language-dependent meaning of basso ostinato while translating it into English, 
thus preparing it to be used within Anglophone academia. As Maruyama was deeply 
influenced by Weimar Republic humanities, the authors’ language competencies 
are combined to provide a kaleidoscope of the socio-political and cultural 
constellations that are submerged in Maruyama’s concept. Consequently, the first 
two sections of this paper trace the intellectual background of basso ostinato and 
provide a contextualization within Japanese social sciences. Furthermore, we 
theorize IR in a historical mode in order to do justice to ‘historical meta-
epistemology’ (Bell, 2009: 15), which allows us to reconsider seemingly self-
evident assumptions that dominate the discipline. In addition, the pitfalls of 
transcendentalism are avoided (Devetak, 2014: 446) by calibrating between the 
‘coherence constraints’ (Bevir, 1997: 167) that influenced Maruyama’s theorizing 
to the same extent as ours. Hence, ours is an abductive approach as we treat basso 
ostinato ‘as a heuristic strategy for pragmatic research’ as one way to approach 
the unsynthesizable in order to find a ‘way through the complexities of the social 
world (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009: 711). To give evidence to this potential, 
the third section engages in a discussion regarding the employment of basso 
ostinato in twenty-first century IR-theorizing by focusing on security studies. 
  
Tracing the Origins of Basso Ostinato: Central European Sociology of 
Knowledge and the Problem of Synthesis  
At the turn of the twentieth century a socio-economic, political, and cultural crisis 
shook Central Europe that stimulated intellectual discourses, leading to the 
establishment of new academic disciplines. In Germany, sociology of knowledge in 
particular became constitutive with the aim of mapping these socio-political 
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disruptions, problematizing the rise of ideologies as a consequence, and discussing 
potential pathways to transcend ideologies (Lichtblau, 1996: 458). Mannheim also 
joined these discussions, and his Ideology and Utopia had a considerable impact on 
scholars across the disciplines. He even found an eager readership in Japan, a 
country that had equally perceived itself to be in a crisis (Maruyama, 1989: 185). 
One of Mannheim’s readers was Maruyama. 
Since only two of Maruyama’s works have been translated into English (Thought 
and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics (1966a) and Studies in the Intellectual 
History of Tokugawa Japan (1974)), he is primarily recognized as a scholar of 
Japanese political thought. However, Maruyama had extensively studied the 
contributions of German humanities during his secondary and tertiary education, 
and it was only when he took up an academic assistantship at Tokyo University’s 
Faculty of Law that he immersed himself in Japanese political thought. Nanbara 
Shigeru, Maruyama’s mentor, had advised him to do so, partly because this would 
later offer him more promising career opportunities in light of a changing political 
climate (Karube, 2008: 74-76). This refocusing in terms of his research, however, 
did not mean that Maruyama discarded his earlier studies. Rather, his training in 
German humanities provided the backbone for his approach to Japanese political 
thought, and it was Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge in particular that helped 
him in this regard (Maruyama, 1974: xxvii), as commonly noted in the literature 
(cf. Barshay, 1992: 381-382; Karube, 2008: 80; Sasaki, 2012: 72).  
In Japan, Maruyama is often critically appraised as a modernist (Bellah, 2003: 143) 
because he challenged Japan’s political status quo and engaged in establishing ‘a 
process of contestation in which new visions of self and other emerge’, as Leigh 
Jenco (2012: 101) puts it. To support a sustainable democratic order in Japan, 
Maruyama tried to support his fellow citizens in their strife to establish a 
(self)critical and skeptical subjectivity (Barshay, 1992: 395-400). This is supposed 
to enable them to transcend narratives of historical determinism and attempts at 
social planning to retain the political status quo. For Maruyama (1997; 2012), the 
evolving political sphere ought to provide a forum in which socio-political 
differences can be freely expressed and discussed in order to establish a societal 
reality that is able to reconcile these differences towards a spatio-temporally 
conditioned common good. In other words, as the societal composition constantly 
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changes, the political remains in flux (Maruyama, 1989: 193). What makes 
Maruyama’s humanistic thought specifically Japanese is best understood by 
considering that he argued for a democracy that would rejuvenate the entrenched 
political elites, who prevented people from developing their subjectivity by 
engaging with distinctively Japanese sources from the Tokugawa and Meiji period 
(Maruyama, 1966b; 1974; 1997). This means that Maruyama developed his critical 
stance within Japanese thought (Bellah, 2003: 141-142) for which Mannheim’s 
stimulus in particular was indispensable. It was this outside influence that provided 
Maruyama (1989: 184) with the epistemological tools that allowed him to reflect 
upon the spatio-temporal conditionality of his own knowledge; this ‘localization’ 
(Acharya, 2014: 653) freed him to see Japanese political thought in a new and 
different light.  
Two aspects in Mannheim’s oeuvre were especially important for Maruyama in 
developing basso ostinato. First, Maruyama (1974: xxviii; 1988a: 68; 1989: 197; 
2007: 21) repeatedly referred to Mannheim’s spatio-temporal conditionality of 
knowledge (Seinsgebundenheit des Denkens) and aspect-structure 
(Aspektstruktur). Employing the former, however, did not imply that human 
understandings of their life-worlds are a distortion of reality or that objectivity is 
impossible. Rather, Maruyama followed Mannheim’s assumption that this merely 
visualizes the selectivity with which people approach their life-worlds, as some of 
their elements are emphasized while others are being neglected. This is the case 
because the conditionality of knowledge is determined by the specific interests of 
the social group in which people are embedded. Being exposed to these interests, 
people are affected in terms of the way they imagine and construct their life-
worlds. In other words, most people forbear the capacity to critically (self)reflect 
on the conditionality of their knowledge-construction, as it is being hampered by a 
multitude of systemic knowledge-power relations within their social groups 
(Mannheim, 1985: 269). It is because of this social embeddedness that a thought-
collective evolves in which people tend to universalize their knowledge by granting 
it the status of normality, leading to socio-cultural spatio-centrism and tempo-
centrism. In accordance with Gerard van der Ree (2014: 222), it can be argued 
that a ‘zero-sum perspective’ evolves in which other thought-collectives are being 
experienced as ontological security threats. Consequently, there is an ideological 
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element in aspect-structure (Mannheim, 1985: 265-266). Embedded within their 
social group, people are characterized by a ‘collective unconscious[ness]’ 
(Mannheim, 1985: 40), as they believe that one’s aspect-structure captures all of 
reality and, therefore, they violently aim to impose it onto other aspect-
structures. It is then the task of social scientists to transcend this spatio-centrism 
and tempo-centrism, and to highlight the conditionality of knowledge by 
visualizing the nexus between the selectivity of one’s perspective and the will of 
one’s social group. Hence, social scientists have ‘to protect one’s work from 
“direct subordination to political forces”, and the “far more difficult” task of 
“bracketing,” that is of “preventing subjective value judgments from insinuating 
themselves into the cognition of political phenomena”’ (Maruyama, in Barshay, 
1992: 398).  
Second, by uncovering the selectivity of knowledge-construction, sociology of 
knowledge faces a ‘problem of synthesis’, as Wolfgang Schneider (2003: 458) 
writes. This problem indicates that stressing the conditionality of knowledge does 
not yet enable it to transcend critical-empirical reflections and bridge the gap 
between theory and practice. Rather, people need to be able to move beyond 
their own aspect-structure in order to develop the ability to willfully contribute to 
the construction of their life-worlds. Hence, as Andrew Barshay (2005: 131) 
contends, a ‘theory and practice of this-worldly transcendence’ has to be 
achieved. People need to understand their own aspect-structure and reject any 
attempts to ideologize it. For Mannheim (1985: 301), in order to achieve this 
transcendence, solutions to this problem cannot be abstract, but instead have to 
consider the specific historical and socio-cultural situation. In other words, 
existential conditionality not only affects peoples’ knowledge-construction, but 
also their ability to transcend their limits. What Mannheim (1985: 5) suggested 
here is a form of perspectivist objectivity which we also find in Maruyama (1981: 
518-519). Objectivity is only gained through a careful hermeneutical interpretation 
of a specific situation, guided by a conceptual framework that contextualizes and 
gives meaning to the myriad of relations that crystallize in this specific moment. 
For this reason, due to the amorphousness of reality, objectivity can only be 
claimed for a specific perspective and moment in time.  
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Solutions to the problem of synthesis therefore are manifold and vary in scope. To 
provide more substantial solutions by enlarging the perspectivist objectivity, 
Mannheim suggested reaching for higher levels of abstraction in one’s thought-
development that are fostered by overlapping social groups. Intellectuals in 
particular are able to engage in abstract knowledge-construction as they are 
‘socially unattached’ (Mannheim, 1985: 155) and they have the ability to 
transgress socio-political boundaries more easily. Mannheim’s elitist approach has 
received much criticism and also Maruyama, following his concerns to establish 
democratic practices in Japan, eventually pursued a different path in finding a 
solution to the problem of synthesis. As Barshay (1992: 379) notes, Maruyama 
aimed to unravel Japan’s ideologized aspect-structure by re-engaging with its 
intellectual and spiritual traditions. Eventually, this becomes a much more 
democratic process, as it is potentially accessible by everyone, although ‘the 
process of attaining this wisdom takes a lifetime of practice and study. Its borders 
are made permeable not by means of prior intellectual or ethnic background, but 
by means of … very hard work’ (Jenco, 2007: 752-753). To provide a basic 
framework that enables access to a wider understanding about reality beyond 
one’s aspect-structure, Maruyama (1989: 199-200) developed basso ostinato in a 
similar manner as Jenco. As the next chapter shows, basso ostinato enabled 
Maruyama to incorporate the spatial side of aspect-structure, while not renouncing 
its temporal aspects. In Maruyama’s (1989: 192)2 words, ‘adding on to previous 
thought-styles or ideas does not happen as a so-called “additive synthesis”, but as 
an adjustment of the way of looking at a problem (Problemstellung)’. 
 
Going Beyond European Sociology of Knowledge: The Japanese Question on 
Power and Space 
While lecturing in Japan in 1978, Michel Foucault referred to Maruyama’s work on 
Edo Period (1603-1868) Confucianism. Comparing pastoral power in Western 
societies and the ‘function and role of Confucianism in the Far East’ (Foucault and 
Watanabe, 2007: 161), Foucault argued that these modes of power emerged 
concurrently in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for similar reasons. Yet, 
                                                 
2
 All translations are by the authors. 
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drawing on Maruyama, he stressed that while pastoral power rests on individual 
promises of salvation in an afterlife, Confucianism promotes a this-worldly 
essentialism (Karube, 2006: 202-203). This episode might seem anecdotal, but 
Foucault acknowledged a difference that had driven much of Maruyama’s 
intellectual endeavor. It was this enterprise, originally drafted as a series of 
articles and later published as Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa 
Japan, through which Maruyama approached the unsynthesizable by conceiving of 
basso ostinato. 
 
Modernity: Singular, or Plural? 
Throughout the rest of his life, Maruyama further developed basso ostinato. His 
plan was to trace its elements from three fields: history, politics, and ethics 
(Maruyama, 1996b: 178-179). On history, Maruyama published a paper in 1972, 
identifying three pivotal terms: become (naru), next (tsugi), and momentum 
(ikioi). A short essay on politics was published in English (1988b), in which he 
extracted a series of concepts related to matsurigoto (governmental affairs). On 
ethics, Maruyama (1976) talked in the United States, in which he focused on a pair 
of binary concepts: pure mind (kiyoki kokoro) and dirty mind (kitanaki kokoro). 
These basso ostinati were meant to help scholars isolate the crucial cognitive gap 
that arises in the process of knowledge transfer, but it remained an inaccessible 
concept and it has been criticized for being deterministic (cf. Koyasu, 1986; Kan, 
1999; Yamaguchi, 2000; Kimura, 2014).  
Before discussing basso ostinato’s potential for security studies, Maruyama’s 
struggle to elaborate this concept, in which his wartime experience played a 
decisive role, has to be further explicated. During the interwar period, Japanese 
scholarship still heavily debated whether world history can be conceived of as a 
singular or plural process. This is of importance, as the former would imply 
acknowledgment of Western superiority. However, many scholars began to argue 
for the latter because of the need to justify an anticipated world war and the 
thrust for their sui generis identity. Until then, Japan had been aiming to escape 
from Asia in their efforts to avoid colonization and, in doing so, had become part 
of the West, as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1934: 40-43) famously maintained. This is 
because Meiji Japan imported elements of European political systems (Tsuda, 
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1938; Maruyama, 1961), turning the country into the first non-Western Westphalian 
state. Thereby, Japan embraced a ‘pluralistic Eurocentric institutionalism’, as 
outlined by Martin Hall and John Hobson (2010: 217-218), meaning that Japan 
acted as a willful follower of the West by affirming the universality of its political 
trajectory.  
In its attempt to turn into a Western state, Japan believed that it had gained the 
status of a great power after defeating Russia in 1905, but soon thereafter it came 
to realize that Western states were not going to accept Japan as an equal. Even 
today, Japan is (inter)nationally perceived as the ‘abnormal’ Western state 
(Hagström, 2015; generally Hobson and Sharman, 2005: 88). Becoming suspicious 
of Western claims of universalism, Japanese politicians and scholars began to 
emphasize their nation’s historical superiority and saw a necessity in overcoming 
modernity, as it was perceived as an equivalent to the West (Maruyama, 1974: 
xxx). Although Japanese historiography still often neglects this point, the dominant 
discourse during the first half of the twentieth century asserted that world history 
had to be conceived of as plurality (Nishida, 1982; Koyama, 2001; Shimizu, 2015), 
arguing that there is not one world history, but many world histories. This 
rhetoric, helping them to argue for equality with, and later even superiority over, 
the West, served as a justification for pursuing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, and eventually ideologized the entire Japanese society (Maruyama, 1961; 
Takeuchi, 1979; Samuels, 2007). 
Maruyama critically reflected on this overcoming modernity debate via intellectual 
history. He was puzzled that, despite the importation of Western nationalism, 
Japan had developed a different type of modern nation-state; thus, he assessed 
this problem in terms of political subjectivity. Despite Japanese claims of being a 
modern democratic state with a constitutional monarchy, the political situation 
was far from it, as the ‘formation of free subjects (jiyuu naru shutai)’ (Maruyama, 
1964: 20) was hampered through the aspect-structure of the kokutai, eventually 
leading to the abolishment of the political sphere altogether. The kokutai argued 
that the Tenno is a direct descendant of the sun-goddess Amaterasu (Maruyama, 
1988a: 45), and this divine ancestry put the Japanese emperor at the center of a 
hierarchical society based around concentric circles (Sasaki, 2012: 38-40). This 
discouraged the public from critically questioning political decisions (Maruyama, 
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1974: 171), as it is an example of taking ‘a reified present and extrapolat[ing] this 
back in time to render all history amenable to transhistorical, universalist analysis’ 
(Hobson and Lawson, 2008: 430). By a priori determining the Tenno’s rule as 
virtuous, Maruyama (1966a: 87) argued that ‘a system of irresponsibility’ was 
established, which allowed Japanese rulers to justify their political decisions as 
part of inevitable, pre-determined historical processes. As a consequence, 
‘societal intolerance’ (Maruyama, 1961: 16) existed in Japan towards dissenting 
voices, eventually rendering the country internally inclusive but externally ‘closed’ 
(Maruyama, 1992: 196).  
It was this discomfort with the depoliticization of Japanese society that primarily 
encouraged Maruyama to work on the history of Edo Confucianism, but he also had 
an ‘extra-academic motive’ (Maruyama, 1974: xxxii). Strongly objecting to the 
dominant discourses of overcoming Western modernity, he was eager to 
demonstrate the universality of human history by stressing Japan’s contribution to 
it. At least in this point, he believed in one world history rather than in its 
plurality by elucidating the process of Confucianism’s internal collapse, which had 
provided Tokugawa Japan with its most salient source of social cohesiveness. 
These two motives translated into two syntheses which Maruyama tried to 
accomplish in his work. As discussed, the latter aspiration aimed to synthesize 
theory and practice. By determining the kokutai as aspect-structure, he aimed to 
uncover a more comprehensive picture of modernity. The former, by contrast, was 
a methodological task. Maruyama’s (1996a: 334) ambition was to investigate ‘how 
to synthesize the internal continuity within the category of thinking and the 
consecutive transformation of meaning within the same category’. For him, it 
often appeared to be continuity that plays a crucial role in this transformation. 
Given Japan’s exceptional homogeneity, its modern intellectual history was a 
demonstration of this paradox, and initially he had hoped that Mannheim’s 
methodology would provide an epistemological tool to simultaneously establish the 
two syntheses. Although his hope proved to be ill-founded, Maruyama discovered a 
site of ‘creative misunderstanding’ where an idea becomes meaningful through 
textual appraisal by locals, as argued by Jenco (2012: 99). At this site, meanings of 
an identical idea are never fully integrated but remain different among multiple 
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actors below the level of consciousness. To explain this in more detail, we have to 
return to Foucault’s lecture.  
 
Creative Misunderstandings? Awareness of Plurality 
As Foucault argued, political power expressed itself differently in Japan’s 
Confucian tradition in comparison to Western countries. However, Maruyama 
(1974) had noticed that power in Japan also diverged from the Chinese 
understanding because Japan had, over several centuries, developed its own 
unique Confucian tradition. At first glance, the Meiji Restoration had replaced this 
traditional political system with a Western one. However, despite this 
transformation, the essential power structure remained the same. Maruyama 
(1961: 12-15) argued that, as a result of importations of different traditions of 
thought, an ‘unstructured tradition’ had developed in Japan. It was there that 
imported knowledge was modified to the extent that cannot be simply equated to 
the original, as it was constantly classified and (re)interpreted ‘in terms of the 
familiar’ (Skinner, 1969: 5) without being reified. Mannheim’s sociology of 
knowledge did not help Maruyama (1961: 68) in this regard, as it did not account 
for these exceptional ‘epistemological characteristics’ in a specific community. 
Therefore, the issue at stake was how seemingly identical knowledge is translated 
in a different epistemological tradition, and how the identified gap can be filled. 
The various cognitions, which developed in different social contexts, cannot be 
presumed to compose parts of the same entity; the assumed cognitive object and 
the tangible cognitions do not have one-on-one relations, even if a cursory 
assessment initially indicates similarity (Maruyama, 1996a). It is not only an 
‘adjustment of the way of looking at a problem’ but also different way of thinking 
that plays a crucial role in this subtle mutation. 
 Analyzing from within Japanese history of thought, Maruyama gradually became 
convinced that it was not only a question of perspective and conditionality of 
knowledge that restricted free subjects to evolve in Japan, but rather fundamental 
structural differences rooted in everyday practices and experiences (Watsuji, 
2011). Renouncing his earlier wartime conviction, modernity had to become 
modernities. Knowledge can only turn into power after it is localized within the 
unique social structure, as in each society the structure evolves differently. 
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Maruyama (1996c: 131) argued that it was particularly geopolitics whose 
methodology allows geopolitical and geohistorical conditionalities of the society 
under scrutiny to be calibrated. In doing so, Maruyama aimed to expand 
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge to the global space because he could focus on 
basso ostinato in contingent foreign knowledge encounters with local knowledge. 
These encounters are spatial and repetitive in function, as the emergence of the 
intersection is considered to be deeply rooted in everyday practices. Hence, these 
practices are historically formed under a specific spatio-temporal condition 
(Maruyama, 1996c; 1997). With this concept, Maruyama tried to capture the site of 
creation where ostensibly repeated nodes take place, albeit in constant flux. At 
this intersection, foreign knowledge gradually affects and is being affected by 
local knowledge and, thereby, is embedded in a new geographical location. Once 
knowledge is attached to its new location it develops into new forms, irrespective 
of its origin. However, the two forms of knowledge – local and foreign – never 
amalgamate; they only synchronize at the site like the barely perceptible bass 
notes and the main theme in a piece of music.         
Defining his task as ‘finding a clue of enquiring the style of thought which has been 
relentlessly streaming under the various modes of historical consciousness down to 
the modern era’, Maruyama (1992: 295-298) tried to identify the ‘category as 
substratum’ by extracting the banal terms mentioned above as keywords by 
exploring some of the oldest Japanese texts1 dating back to the eighth and ninth 
centuries. This, what contemporary IR-scholarship (cf. Friedrichs and Kratchowil, 
2009; Friedrichs, 2009; Sil, 2009) would identify as an abductive approach, was a 
‘sort of circular argument’ because he had identified the bass notes a priori in 
contemporary discourses, and then projected them into the past (Maruyama, 1992: 
298). However, there is a danger in proceeding in this manner. Besides the 
difficulty of unearthing something that belongs to a subconscious realm, any 
attempt to reify it in textual form can create stereotypes and subsequently be 
criticized as historical and geographical determinism. As Charles Taylor argues (in 
Thrift, 1996: 9), ‘to situate our understanding in practice is to see it as implicit in 
our activity’. Pinning down this implicitness can result in mistreating subjects (and 
objects) – the result of discourses - as producers of discourses (Müller, 2008). 
Consequently, ‘the role of language in shaping experience’ (Nelson, 1992: 41) is 
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expunged and this procedure can eventually lead to stereotypes by codifying a 
specific reality (Bhabha, 1983: 23). It is for this reason that it has remained a 
difficult concept to date, with only a few scholars attempting to engage with it. 
Indeed, Japanese scholarship (cf. Koyasu, 1986) has even accused Maruyama of 
supporting Japanese wartime propaganda. Maruyama refuted these accusations, 
arguing that Japan’s ‘exceptional homogeneity’ is based on its unique geography, 
but it does not make the motif stable. Rather, the motif is bound to change as 
conditions are continuously transforming (Maruyama, 1996c). Still, by extracting 
the terms, he risked justifying Japan’s alleged perpetual uniqueness by reifying 
the subject as the discourse producer.  
  
The Substance of Difference: Basso Ostinato and Comprehensive Security 
In consideration of these criticisms, basso ostinato needs to be fine-tuned as a 
heuristic device. We achieve this by first situating it within current assemblage 
thought (cf. Collier and Ong, 2005; Anderson et al., 2012; Dittmer, 2013; Acuto 
and Simon, 2014) and pragmatism in IR (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009; Hellman, 
2009; Abraham and Abramson, 2015). On this basis, we frame a collective (in our 
case Japan) as a community of experience developed in an imagined relational 
space (Harvey, 2006) in an effort to escape determinism by simultaneously 
emphasizing its communal character, as well as stressing individual elements. As 
this community belongs to a relational space, it is individually perceived but still 
shared between people. In it, a specific collective identity can be observed, but it 
is merely an aggregate of individual perceptions. People continuously (re)define 
themselves by imagining a particular environment that is, however, continuously 
changing, assembling often unconsciously around a specific nodal point. In a 
second step, basso ostinato is employed as a heuristic device in contemporary 
debates in security studies because it ‘allows us to see how ideas located in 
different times and regions diverge from the style of thought we have created on 
the basis of materials drawn from a particular time and space’ (Nelson, 1992: 40).  
 
Basso Ostinato as a Heuristic Device 
To be able to use Maruyama’s concept as a heuristic device, we start with two 
insights from the previous chapters. First, when intellectual history is understood 
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through historicization and geographicalization, the either-or-question between 
“true” consciousness and “false” consciousness is dissolved because scholars can 
focus on difference itself, rather than on the validity of interpretations. As 
recently stressed by Qin (2016: 38), this is because every human perspective is 
constrained by a specific conditionality of knowledge, which is why it projects 
reality as much as it contributes to its distortion, and the nexus between the two 
bring about subjectivity. Even the possibility that people are talking about an 
analogous but factually different object has to be taken into consideration. Thus, 
when the idea of absolute truth is abandoned, the possibility arises to consider 
misunderstandings in a more productive way by conceiving of knowledge as 
‘knowledges’ (Thrift, 1999: 303). As Mannheim (1985: 168) remarks, ‘a 
Weltanschauung is not of necessity a source of error, but often gives access to 
spheres of knowledge otherwise closed’. Indeed, cultural otherness is what ‘makes 
learning of any type possible’ (Jenco, 2015: 23). However, knowledge needs to 
address existing ‘figurations of alterity’ (Guillaume, 2003: 88) in a foreign space. 
The result of this process might look like the same knowledge but in practice it 
contains an unsynthesizable cognitive void, denying a linear developmental model 
of intellectual history in international contexts.  
Second, if it is this cognitive void that enables the assimilation of foreign 
knowledge, it must be there where people develop their subjectivity. This 
conclusion was unsettling for Maruyama, who had begun his intellectual endeavor 
with the ambition to diminish misinterpretation of foreign knowledge because, as 
the second synthesis alludes, Maruyama’s research from the beginning held a 
politicized assumption (generally Huysmans, 2002: 43). In this respect, Maruyama’s 
orientation contains the danger of altering this analytical device into a tool for 
teleological reasoning, which was his reason for refusing to think more about the 
importance of space for basso ostinato, although the relation was unavoidable as 
he conceived of modernity as modernities. As mentioned, Maruyama thought it was 
the aspect-structure represented as kokutai in Japanese society that hampered the 
comprehension of foreign knowledge, which impeded the Japanese people from 
experiencing themselves as free subjects. In order to unearth the falsity of 
kokutai, he further elaborated basso ostinato. However, what if it was this 
embodiment of Japanese history that generated the misunderstanding which 
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facilitates the whole process of comprehension of the unknown? If so, it is this 
“falsity” that has enabled Japan to establish itself as the first non-Western modern 
nation-state, allowing it to join a putative universal history. In other words, it was 
the very idea of the kokutai that helped people to reestablish a political sphere by 
conceiving of Japan as part of the globe.  
Therefore, foreign knowledge cannot be understood comprehensively, but it is only 
accepted when it has gained meaning in reference to already-existing local ideas. 
Thus, his second synthesis - of universal theory and local practice - proved to be a 
failure because Japan’s experience demonstrates that knowledge can be aptly 
localized only through a radical but automatic adjustment. However, it was the 
first synthesis - of continuity and change in analysis of intellectual history - that 
basso ostinato can shed further light on because it depicts entangled relations that 
are ‘as much internal as they are external’ (Allen, 2012: 191). What comprises an 
assemblage therefore is not just the internality of an autonomous subject, but 
internality in relation to externality. Yet, because the linkage is only manifested 
in the unsynthesizable cognitive void, it remains largely unnoticed. Hence, 
anticipating contemporary discourses in geography (cf. Livingstone, 2005; Ibert, 
2007), Maruyama perceived this process as collective and active, yet unconscious.  
Because of his wartime experience, Maruyama was suspicious of this cognitive void 
and aimed to overcome it. His perpetual aspiration for cosmopolitanism and 
modernism to establish a “healthy” political subjectivity in Japan led him to this 
conclusion. As a corollary, Maruyama realized its contradictory character. Although 
it rests on the irreconcilability between different basso ostinati, it links local 
practices to a putative universal theory. This means that this concept helps IR-
scholarship to understand that a universal issue can only be understood locally, 
where it is perceived through the lenses of site-specific knowledge with the 
potential that this issue is “misunderstood”. This makes the process a product of 
multiple relations, but it contains ‘an emergent “thingness”’ (Allen, 2012: 190), 
giving substance to an issue of universal appeal. Knowledge is thus de-
contextualized and re-contextualized across diverse social and cultural situations 
beyond territory and context (Collier and Ong, 2005). What is required, therefore, 
is an investigation ‘at the point where the global is inserted and translated into 
the local’ (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009: 6). Basso ostinato can help to 
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rearticulate this point and, in fact, it can render this distinction between the 
global and local altogether obsolete. This is because a ‘geography of relations’ 
(Allen, 2012: 192) can be mapped, helping to surpass assumptions that processes of 
localizing knowledge only happen in spatial proximity. Rather, basso ostinato 
indicates that the linkage between local and global is primarily taking place 
unconsciously. This is where the positive aspect of the void arises. To understand 
the unknown, people find a clue in reference to the known (Skinner, 1969). In this 
process, knowledge is automatically morphed into an indigenous idea. However, 
because it happens at the nascent stage of the process, it is often left unnoticed, 
although this cognitive gap of the unsynthesizable persists even after developing a 
deeper mutual understanding due to its autopoietic character.  
 
Thick Signifier and Comprehensive Security 
In order to account for the prospects of basso ostinato, we begin by identifying 
how difference relates to the issues the international community is facing. The 
intellectual struggle of Maruyama indicates that difference can be too subtle to 
notice, but it is still fundamental. It is not just about what it means, but 
particularly the way it means. Hence, following Patrick Jackson (2009: 658), we 
aim for a ‘systematic demonstration of what one gets, empirically, if one 
apprehends the world with a given sensibility’. It is a ‘disciplined effort to envision 
what the world would look like if explained and understood according to some 
ideal-typically elaborated set of value-commitments’.    
To exemplify this further, we take up the concept of security as an example. 
Looking at the discipline at large, recent scholarship has asked to what extent 
analytical tools that were developed in contemporary Western academia are 
applicable to other spatio-temporal contexts (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 378; also 
Acharya, 2014). However, in order to know the effect of intercultural 
decontextualizations and recontextualizations, we need to first investigate the 
system of localization. Even with security, one of the main concepts of IR, this is 
not yet given, as Buzan already pointed out in 1983. For him, it is ‘an unexplored 
and essentially contested concept’ (in Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 135; also Dalby, 
1997: 6). This is because its investigation has been largely limited to questions of 
its referent object as delineated by Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009: 135). Since the 
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linguistic turn in the 1980s, IR has conceptualized security as a practice, rather 
than as an objective concept. Particularly constructivist and poststructuralist 
scholarship contributed to this insight by demonstrating that security politics rests 
on the construction of an alien other (cf. Dalby, 1988; Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 
2006; Browning, 2008). In many cases, their aspirations are guided by finding 
alternatives through uncovering the ideological function of dominant security 
discourses (cf. Neumann, 1999; Huysmans, 2002). In other words, security is 
considered to be manipulable by autonomous subjects (Mϋller, 2008). A corollary 
of this ambition has been the emphasis on overcoming boundaries, and in doing so, 
many of their contributions share the ambition of Maruyama’s second synthesis. 
However, as already mentioned, Maruyama’s ambition had failed. The initial 
development of discourse is essentially beyond the control of people because it 
largely evolves unconsciously. It is in this sense that this putative construction is 
indeed contingent. Thus, security discourses are better characterized as 
‘performativity rather than construction’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 46; italics in 
the original). As Ringmar (2016: 119) argues, ‘states, as well as the international 
system in which they interact, are imagined only as they are performed’. This 
means, however, that we have to shift our attention from boundaries to within the 
spaces confined by these boundaries (Sassen, 2013), and focus on where a specific 
discourse is performed. If Maruyama is right, then it is not around the boundaries 
where different worldviews collide, but within communities which are connected 
to the outside through an unconscious cognitive gap.   
To shift this focus, security has to be conceived in the more substantial sense as 
Huysmans (1998) has suggested by drawing on the term ‘thick signifier’. He notes 
that ‘the meaning of security does not just depend on the specific analytical 
questions it raises, it also articulates particular understandings of our relation to 
nature, other human beings and the self’ (Huysmans, 1998: 228). “Thick”, 
therefore, signifies a heterogeneous assemblage of actors, histories, and 
(im)material contexts that securitize an issue in a specific space. Basso ostinato 
can help to further uncover the substance of this thickness through which IR can 
gain a deeper knowledge of security as a manifestation of everyday relations in a 
geographically defined, yet ever-changing community. Hence, security is site-
specific (Allen, 2003) and it highlights the relation between what Rita Abrahamsen 
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and Michael Williams (2009: 14) call in reference to Michael Barnett and Raymond 
Duval ‘compulsory power’ and ‘productive power’. While compulsory power 
signifies the ability to control the actions of others through the use of violence, 
productive power is characteristic of actors that can influence site-specific 
relations to their advantage (also Qin, 2016: 43). In this sense, security is ‘a result 
or effect of productive power, and agents of productive power in specific sites’ 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009: 14, emphasis in the original). Hence, productive 
power shifts the meaning of security, and it is affected by conceptualizations of 
security at the same time. Basso ostinato tells us that these shifts are connected 
at each site to what people perceive to be an internal continuity through elements 
of mundane, everyday life. However, these elements ‘may and indeed do endure 
in many respects, but that is not the same as saying that there is a fixed, 
unchangeable essence to them’ (Allen, 2012: 192). 
Within these current security discourses, several different conceptions have 
evolved. One of them is comprehensive security, whose terminological origin can 
be traced back to Japanese discourses during the 1970s and 1980s. In what follows, 
we demonstrate how basso ostinato illuminates difference by taking 
comprehensive security as an example. We trace its development in Japanese 
scholarship and contrast it to Western scholarship in order to show how the 
specific meaning of a term performs differently in different spaces. 
Comprehensive security first appeared as an official term in a document from 1980 
titled Report of the Comprehensive National Security Study Group, prepared by a 
group of scholars who had been commissioned by the Japanese Prime Minister 
Ohira Masayoshi. By referring to this form of security as sogo (total), its 
rapporteurs aimed to devise a more appropriate conceptualization of security with 
the purpose of readdressing Japan’s foreign policy in light of a changing world. At 
the time this report was prepared, Japan had been struggling with the changing 
geopolitical conditions in East Asia, particularly after Richard Nixon’s visit to China 
in 1972 and the following rapprochement between the two countries, and the 
faltering global economic situation after the second oil crisis in 1979.  
In Western scholarship, however, this Japanese understanding of security has been 
frequently misrepresented. This is because the same notion rests on different 
basso ostinati, as already evidenced in the first use of comprehensive security in 
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Anglophone literature. John Chapman, Reinhard Drifte, and I.T.M. Gow (1983: xvi) 
argue in their book on Japan’s Quest for Comprehensive Security that this concept 
is merely ‘a smoke-screen behind which the hawks can expand defense spending’ 
and it merely cloaks Japan’s economic interests. This reading of comprehensive 
security as the ruthless pursuit of economic interests came to be a common ground 
in Western scholarship to understand this “new” conception. This is confirmed in 
an influential piece by Akaha Tsuneo (1991: 324) in which he argued that ‘in the 
early 1980s Japan adopted a "comprehensive security" (sogo anzen hosho) policy 
with greater emphasis on economic and diplomatic means than on military means 
for pursuing the nation's security’. Emphasizing this economic aspect further, 
Richard Samuels (2007: 3) argues that Japanese pragmatism subordinates ‘military 
to economic sector, deliberately practicing mercantile realism to generate 
prosperity and provide security at the same time’ ever since Japan encountered 
Western modernity after having been forced to open its country. Although 
presenting a more nuanced reading, Buzan and Hansen (2009: 136) still indicate a 
largely analogous comprehension by delineating comprehensive security as 
‘[r]etain[ing] a national security focus but widened the agenda away from just 
military security to other concerns, particularly economic, political, and 
environmental threats’.  
This is not to argue that these Western interpretations misread Japan’s real 
intentions, but they overlook a specific spatio-historical aspect of the debate 
because Japan’s comprehensive concept of security transcended the at that time 
predominant Western reading of security as the absence of military threat. Rather, 
basso ostinato as a heuristic device alienates ‘from the concern of our immediate 
life-experience’ (Rytövuori-Apunen, 2009: 644). In this way, basso ostinato 
unearths that this seemingly realist, and at best potentially new, 
conceptualization of security was indeed neither a realist conception, nor was it 
new from a Japanese perspective (Hughes, 2004: 120-127). The initial report from 
1980 already gave this indication by referring back to the wartime period in its 
conceptualization of comprehensive security. This report argued that Japan 
attained modernization less than a century after its forced opening, despite its 
cultural differences from the West. The ‘mission of Japan in world history’ is to 
contribute to ‘the order of building relations between the South and the North’. 
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Economic cooperation is in this regard ‘the only assertive way’ to ‘promote 
friendly relations’ (Sogo Anzenhosho Kenkyu Gurupu, 1980). Notwithstanding 
Japan’s brutal imperial regime in which tens of thousands of women were forced 
into prostitution, the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere also 
spread among Japanese scholarship as a potential for its members to break free 
from European suppression through a comprehensive “humanistic” and economic 
cooperation that could overcome both capitalism and communism (Showa 
Kenkyukai, 1939; Royama, 1941; Ezawa, 1941). It is in this regard that it linked to 
the wartime notion of kokubo (protecting the national land) in terms of ‘particular 
understandings of our relation to nature, other human beings and the self’ 
(Huysmans, 1998: 228). Indeed, this comprehensive understanding of security was 
already being used as a means for common development, as exemplified in a 
confidential document by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1936. In this 
document, economy does not refer to individual gains, and therefore to a selfish 
reference to exploitation, but it is employed to depict co-prosperity through co-
operation and sustainability. This holistic reasoning reflects early twentieth 
century statements of Japanese intellectuals, such as the one by the philosopher 
Watsuji Tetsuro (1937), who argued that ‘Japan fills a unique status in modern 
world civilization’ due to its versatile political, economic, and cultural relations, 
and even its climate (Sevilla 2014).  
This longstanding comprehensive understanding of security continues in Japan’s 
post-war security arrangements in which Japan largely abandoned its military 
capability. This is evidenced in the influential “Yoshida Doctrine”, which evolved 
in light of the nuclear arms race that forced Japan to react due to its close ties 
with the USA and its proximity to China and the Soviet Union. Named after Japan’s 
first Prime Minister after the Second World War Yoshida Shigeru, this doctrine 
formed the basis for Japanese foreign policy after the Second World War. 
Commonly, it is interpreted to be a prime example of Japan’s pragmatist security 
policy that prioritizes economic growth (cf. Pyle, 1996; Samuels, 2007). However, 
reading it in this way falls short of seeing that Japan continues to employ a pre-
war comprehensive understanding in which economy forms just one, albeit 
significant aspect of security (Nakanishi, 2004). This continuation is further 
evidenced in Japan’s promotion of human security. Although this is gradually 
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changing under the current Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (Auslin, 2016), 
human security has been a pillar of Japan’s diplomatic efforts since the early 
1990s. Alongside Japan, Canada and Norway in particular have campaigned for 
human security internationally. While it may be that human security sustains 
Canada’s aspiration as a middle-power and supports Norway’s ambitions for a 
permanent membership to the UN Security Council (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 204), 
it resonates with Japan’s comprehensive security, helping Japan to find ways to 
cooperate with a group of culturally and geographically diverse countries.   
Tracing the basso ostinato of Japan’s understanding of security is an example of 
how, in this case, the concept of security is performed differently in different 
contexts, despite employing the same term. The critique and negligence of 
Anglophone academia is a reflection of their own security-related basso ostinato, 
and consequently we see a cognitive void between the different basso ostinati. 
This is not the place to argue that one conceptualization of security is more apt for 
current international politics than the other. Previous scholarship (cf. Shani, 2008; 
Ringmar, 2012) has addressed this question for international politics at large. 
Rather, it helps to clarify how meaning performs. If these substantial differences, 
which are related to how meanings perform and how people connect security to 
their life-worlds, had been known before the discussion on comprehensive security 
emerged in the 1980s, this discussion might have taken a different, and for both 
sides more fruitful, direction. 
 
Conclusion 
Amitav Acharya (2014: 656-657) concluded his presidential address at the ISA 
Annual Convention with the following remark: 
 
‘[t]he study of IR should not obscure, but celebrate the differences among 
its different theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches. 
But in so doing, it should also strive for greater respect for diversity in our 
knowledge sources and claims, historical experiences, and beliefs and 
approaches about world order. The challenge is not just to make the study 
of IR “safe” for diversity but also be enriched by that diversity’. 
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It was the intention of our paper to contribute to this ambition. We did not aim to 
achieve this contribution merely empirically by unearthing experiences and 
approaches beyond the Western repertoire, or to further the potential of 
incorporating these differences into IR’s theorizing, but ours was particularly a 
historico-theoretical discussion into a more substantial issue, as we reflected on 
the space that exists between the self and other. By focusing on contemporary 
security discourses, we demonstrated that merely charting these differences does 
not establish them as repositories of multiplicities per se (Ling, 2014); rather, the 
discipline needs to further reflect on this unsynthesizable space in the self and 
other, as it is in this space that foreign knowledge is localized and something can 
be created ‘which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object 
of cognition or imagination’ (Arendt, 1961: 151). 
We believe that Maruyama’s basso ostinato is particularly useful for this 
discussion. Reflecting upon basso ostinato is a continuous process with an 
unsatisfying result. We will never be able to fully grasp this underlying pattern 
that literally makes “us”, as it is in constant flux. However, it enables people to 
realize that there are boundaries between them and others. These boundaries are 
not fortifying a belligerent international realm, but their realization enables 
people to engage in this realm because this awareness frees people to greet 
differences in the sense envisaged by Acharya (2014; also Qin, 2016) and work 
together open-mindedly, as knowing about one’s own boundaries helps people to 
understand that the other is beyond them; therefore, it is only with the other 
through which we can gain a deeper understanding about our life-worlds, as we 
gain an enhanced perspective through which we can give meaning to them. 
As Maruyama’s life-long project demonstrates, Japan’s difficulty as the first 
follower of Western modernity has led to a fundamental inconsistency between 
foreign (European) theory and local (Japanese) practice. Nakamura Yujiro (1971) 
points out that many Japanese scholars have tried to employ Western thought by 
replacing the subject and interpreting it in the local context. However, these 
attempts have often ended up as a mere direct translation or arbitrary 
interpretation to plunge into an ‘unbounded subjectivism’, as these Western 
thoughts have not yet been consciously filtered through the ‘logic of Japanese 
language’. Instead, Nakamura suggests an alternative: starting with an 
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acknowledgment that any social institution, including language, is the 
objectification of human will. Any traveling theory between cultures is then 
acknowledged as a product of multiple straightjackets, containing unsynthesizable 
subjectivities. Only by knowing this limitation to our objectivity, can we transcend 
boundaries for a truly mutual understanding, and it was this aspiration towards an 
alternative path that drove Maruyama. 
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